This paper discusses the current crisis in the German 
Introduction
Renewed competitiveness of small and medium sized producers, timely decentralization on the part of large producers and a robust infrastructure for supporting decentralized flexible production all contributed to a very heady atmosphere within many German industrial regions during the later half of the 1980s. The southwest province of Baden Wurttemberg, in particular, was heralded within Germany as a AliiJterl3ndle (a model or showpiece Land) and was widely admired throughout Europe and North America for its dynamic, high quality producers and its effective industrial policy (Cooke and Morgan 1990a, 1990b ; Funck and Becher 1994; Hassink 1992; Herrigel 1993; Semlinger 1993) . Moreover, at a time when it seemed that things could not get much better, the Berlin ivall fell and Germany was unified, giving a new boost to the business cycle and longer life to the already very extended boom. As the 1990s began, it truly appeared that flexible, decentralized production in Germany, and in particular Baden Wurttemberg, had hit upon the secret for enduring competitive success in a turbulent, rapidly changing international market environment (Katzenstein 1989; Simon 1992 (Cooke, 1994; Cooke el al. 1993; Engelmann et al. 1994; Iwer 1994 They had a tendency to 'overengineer' their products.
. They were unable to lower their production costs into competitive ranges.
Both parties further agreed that producers had become overly rigid and bureaucratic (Iwer 1994: 50-9 (Iv-er 1994; Naschold 1994) . One side wanted to shift the blame and ultimately the burden of adjustment onto labour, the other side onto management.
As politically weighty as each of these positions may be, neither one is altogether satisfactory as an explanation for the crisis. Though it is true that German wages are higher than most of their major competitors' (and particularly those of the Japanese and Americans), the gap is moderate and, moreover, has not changed appreciably from the period of the 1980s when German competitiveness was being celebrated (Iwer 1994: 30-43 (Aoki 1988 ; Koike and Takenori 1987; Nishigushi 1992; Rommel et al. 1995; Shingo 1987 Shingo , 1992 IVomack et al. 1990 (Morgan 1994 German industry were well beIow those in the Japanese industry, which grew at an even more spectacular rate (see Tables 1 and 2 ). Labour productivity in the German industry, moreover, did not keep pace with increases in output over the period, while in Japan they did. The gravty of this trend appears, however, only when German performance in international markets in the 1990s is taken into account. The incursion of Japanese and American producers into markets the Germans once dominated is indicated by the movement of world production and trade figures in the 1990s (see Tables 3 and 4 (Adelmann 1979; Lee 1978) .
During the period of rationalization, firms collectively limited themselves to the production of a limited range of product in order to stabilize product market competition in a broad array of specialized manufacturing industries (Herrigel 1995: ch. 2). These reforms in the structure of product markets had significant consequences for the organization of production and labour markets within specialized producers: in particular, it made the very broad and general knowledge typical of nineteenth-century skilled craftsmen no longer necessary. Through a long and intense process of social and workplace struggle between management and labour, rationalization ultimately transformed the identity and the role of the skilled worker in specialist production: specific kinds of skills were constructed as specific specialties with (Streeck 1987 (Chandler 1990; Hartmann 1959 (Lawrence 1980; Locke 1984 and (Lawrence 1980; Pross and Boetticher 1971) .
For all of the many strengths and successes of these two 'doxic' features (Bourdieu 1977) of specific skill jurisdictions and functional divisions within management over the course of the period since the early twentieth century, both of these clusters of roles and institutions within the German industrial system are proving to be disadvantageous under the current conditions of extremely rapid production and technological change (Herrigel 1995 ; Kern and Sabel 1993 
